A SAMPLE OF SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT


SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT






(In compliance with the international ship and port facility security (ISPS) code)





M/V XX


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Contents

1. Purpose 1
2. Responsibilities 1
2.1 Company Responsibility 1
2.2 The Company Security Officer (CSO) 1
2.3 The Ship Security Officer (SSO) 1
3. SSA Requirements 2
3.1 On-scene security survey 2
3.2 Documentation 2
3.3 Independence of assessment and approval activities 2
3.4 Approval of SSP and SSA documentation 2
3.5 Language requirements 3
3.6 Training for ship security 3
3.7 Implementation, verification, certification 3
4. SSA Performance 4
4.1 Assessment planning 4
4.1.1 Review of information 4
4.1.2 Elements to be considered 4
4.1.3 Expert assistance 4
4.1.4 Information to be obtained and recorded by the CSO 5
4.2 Performance 5
4.2.1 On-scene security survey 5
4.2.2 Access to the ship 6
4.2.3 Determination of existing security measures and guidance 6
4.2.4 Protection priorities 6
4.2.5 Identification of possible threats 7
4.2.6 Consideration of conflicts 7
4.2.7 The effect of security measures on ship's personnel 7
4.2.8 Reporting 7
4.3 Follow up 8
4.3.1 Periodic Review of the SSA. 8
Appendix 1: Step 1 likelihood of threat motives 9
Step 2 existing security measures 11
Appendix 2: threat scenarios 13
Consequence assessment 14
Vulnerability assessment 14
Mitigation 15
Appendix 3: step 1 Mitigation determine 17
Step 2 implementation 20
Appendix 4: initial on-scene survey 21
Appendix 5: Ship Security Assessment (SSA) report 25

1. Purpose
The purpose of a SSA is to identify and analyze the security risks for a given type of ship in a trading area. The results of the security assessment provide the basis for measures which are essential to develop, implement, maintain and update the ship security plan (SSP).
2. Responsibilities
2.1 Company responsibility:
The company shall appoint:
1. a company security officer (CSO) for the company
2. a ship security officer (SSO) for each ship
The Company must provide the necessary support to ensure that the CSO, the Master and the SSO are able to perform their duties and responsibilities in compliance with the ISPS Code.
2.2 The Company Security Officer (CSO)
The CSO has to ensure that the SSA is carried out by competent persons with appropriate skills to evaluate the security of a ship, in accordance with the requirements of Part A of the ISPS Code taking into account the guidance given in Part B of the ISPS Code.

The duties and responsibilities of the CSO related to the SSA include, but are not limited to:
1. Advising what threats may be encountered by the vessel, using appropriate security assessments and other relevant information;
2. Ensuring that the initial SSA and the periodic reviews of the assessments are carried out;
3. Ensuring the development and maintenance of the SSP;
4. Modifying the SSP to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual vessel;
5. Enhancing security awareness and vigilance;
6. Ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for the security of the vessel;
7. Coordinating implementation of the SSP with the SSO and the relevant designated representative on behalf of the port or PFSO;
8. Coordinating and ensuring consistency between security requirements and safety requirements;
9. Ensuring that, if sister ship or fleet security plans are used, the plan for each vessel accurately reflects the vessel-specific information and;
10. Ensuring that any alternative or equivalent arrangements approved for a particular vessel or group of vessels are implemented and maintained.
2.3 The Ship Security Officer (SSO)
The duties and responsibilities of the SSO related to the SSA include, but are not limited to:
1. Regular security inspections of the vessel;
2. Implementing, maintaining, and monitoring the SSP;
3. Proposing modifications to the SSP;
4. Enhancing security awareness and vigilance on board;
5. Ensuring that adequate training has been provided to vessel personnel;
6. Coordinating implementation of the SSP with the CSO and the relevant designated representative on behalf of the port facility;
7. ensuring that security equipment onboard the vessel or associated with vessel security is properly operated, tested, calibrated and maintained; and reviewing and completing a Declaration of Security agreement.

3. SSA Requirements
3.1 On-scene security survey
A SSA must include an on-scene (i.e. on board) security survey covering, as a minimum, the security aspects specified in 4.2.1 and the following:
1. Identification of existing security measures, procedures and operations;
2. Identification and evaluation of key ship board operations and their relevance to security risks and their importance to be protected;
3. Identification of possible threats to the key ship board operations, the likelihood of their occurrence and the consequences if they occur, in order to establish and prioritize security measures;
4. Identification of weaknesses, including human factors in the infrastructure, policies and procedures; and
5. Identification, selection and prioritization of counter measures and procedural changes and their level of effectiveness in reducing the ship’s vulnerability.
3.2 Documentation
The SSA must be:
1. Documented by the assessor;
2. Reviewed, accepted and retained by Company management.
3.3 Independence of assessment and approval activities
The CSO must ensure that the RSO undertaking the review and approval of a SSP has not been involved in the preparation or performance of the SSA, the SSP or in the amendment procedure.
3.4 Approval of SSP and SSA documentation
The SSP has to be developed on the basis of the results of the SSA. The SSP, or amendments thereto, and the documentation of the SSA or amendments, on which basis the plan has been developed, have to be submitted to the flag State administration or to the RSO for approval.

3.5 Language requirements
The SSP must be written in the working language or languages of the ship. If the working language used is not English, French or Spanish, a translation into one of these languages is required to be included. The same applies to the SSA documentation.
3.6 Training for ship security
To fulfill their duties and responsibilities the CSO and SSO shall have knowledge and have received training in the following subjects, as appropriate:
1. security administration;
2. relevant international conventions, codes and recommandations;
3. relevant Government legislation and regulations;
4. responsibilities and functions of other security organizations;
5. methodology of SSA;
6. methods of ship security surveys and inspections;
7. ship and port operations and conditions
8. ship and port facility security measures;
9. emergency preparedness and response; contingency planning;
10. instruction techniques for security training and education, including security measures and procedures;
11. handling of sensitive security related information and security related communications;
12. knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
13. recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
14. recognition, on a non discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
15. techniques used to circumvent security measures;
16. security equipment and systems and their operational limitations;
17. methods of conducting audits, inspection, control and monitoring;
18. methods of physical searches and non-intrusive inspections;
19. security drills and exercises, including drills and exercises with port facilities; and
20. Assessment of security drills and exercises.
3.7 Implementation, verification, certification
The security measures specified in the SSP must be implemented, i.e. in operation, prior to the verification conducted by an RSO or flag State administration.
Initial verification of compliance with the ISPS Code and issuance of the International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) is dependent on the effective implementation of the SSP and the absence of non-compliances.
4. SSA Performance
4.1 Assessment planning
4.1.1 Review of information
Prior to commencement of the SSA the CSO shall collect and review all available information including:
1. threats for the ports the ship is calling at and the possible impact on the security of the ship and crew;
2. port facilities and protective measures available;
3. specific security guidance offered by the Contracting Governments;
4. any security needs and security reports;
5. all the information required by 4.1.4;
6. Where feasible the CSO should meet with appropriate persons on the ship and in the port facilities to discuss the purpose and methodology of the assessment.
4.1.2 Elements to be considered:
A SSA should address the following elements on board or of the ship itself:
1. physical security;
2. structural integrity;
3. personnel protection systems;
4. procedural policies;
5. radio and telecommunication systems, including computer systems and networks;
6. Other areas that may, if damaged or used for illicit observation, pose a risk to people, property, or operations on board the ship or within a port facility.
4.1.3 Expert assistance
Those involved in a SSA should be able to draw upon expert assistance in relation to:
1. knowledge of current security threats and patterns;
2. recognition and detection of weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
3. recognition, on a non-discriminatory basis, of characteristics and behavioral patterns of persons who are likely to threaten security;
4. techniques used to circumvent security measures;
5. methods used to cause a security incident;
6. effects of explosives on ship’s structures and equipment;
7. ship security;
8. ship/port interface business practices;
9. contingency planning, emergency preparedness and response;
10. physical security;
11. radio and telecommunications systems, including computer systems and networks;
12. marine engineering; and
13. Ship and port operations.
4.1.4 Information to be obtained and recorded by the CSO
Information needed by the CSO for the performance of the SSA includes:
1. the general layout of the ship;
2. the location of areas which should have restricted access;
3. the location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship;
4. changes in the tide which may have an impact on the vulnerability or security of the ship;
5. the cargo spaces and stowage arrangements;
6. the locations where the ship’s stores and essential maintenance equipment is stored;
7. the locations where unaccompanied baggage is stored;
8. the emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services;
9. the number of ship’s personnel, any existing security duties and any existing training requirement practices of the Company;
10. existing security and safety equipment for the protection of passengers and ship’s personnel;
11. escape and evacuation routes and assembly stations which have to be maintained to ensure the orderly and safe emergency evacuation of the ship;
12. existing agreements with private security companies providing ship/waterside security services; and
13. existing security measures and procedures in effect, including inspection and, control procedures, identification systems, surveillance and monitoring equipment, personnel identification documents and communication, alarms, lighting, access control and other appropriate systems.
4.2 Performance
4.2.1 On-scene security survey
An on-scene security survey has to be carried out on each ship. The objective of the on-scene security survey is to examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations for:
1. ensuring the effective implementation of all ship security duties;
2. monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access;
3. controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems;
4. monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding the ship;
5. controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects (accompanied and unaccompanied baggage and ship’s personnel personal effects);
6. supervising the handling of cargo and the delivery of ship’s stores; and
7. Ensuring that ship security communication, information, and equipment are readily available.
Preparation of an effective SSP should rest on a thorough assessment of all issues that relate to the security of the ship, including, in particular, a thorough appreciation of the physical and operational characteristics, including the voyage pattern, of the individual ship.
4.2.2 Access to the ship
The SSA should examine each identified point of access, including open weather decks, and evaluate its potential for use by individuals who might seek to breach security. This includes points of access available to individuals having legitimate access as well as those who seek to obtain unauthorized entry.
4.2.3 Determination of existing security measures and guidance
The SSA should consider the continuing relevance of the existing security measures and guidance, procedures and operations, under both routine and emergency conditions and should determine security guidance including:
1. the restricted areas;
2. the response procedures to fire or other emergency conditions;
3. the level of supervision of the ship’s personnel, passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, dock workers;
4. the frequency and effectiveness of security patrols;
5. the access control systems, including identification systems;
6. the security communications systems and procedures;
7. the security doors, barriers and lighting; and
8. The security and surveillance equipment and systems, if any.
4.2.4 Protection priorities
The SSA should include the persons, activities, services and operations that it is important to protect. This includes:
1. the ship as such;
2. the ship’s personnel;
3. passengers, visitors, vendors, repair technicians, port facility personnel, etc;
4. the capacity to maintain safe navigation and emergency response;
5. the cargo, particularly dangerous goods or hazardous substances;
6. the ship’s stores;
7. the ship security communication equipment and systems, if any; and
8. the ship’s security surveillance equipment and systems, if any;
9. Key shipboard operations required to function in an emergency.
4.2.5 Identification of possible threats
The SSA should consider all possible threats, which may include the following types of security incidents:
1. damage to, or destruction of, the ship or of a port facility, e.g. by explosive devices, arson, sabotage or vandalism;
2. hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board;
3. tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship’s stores;
4. unauthorized access or use, including presence of stowaways;
5. smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction;
6. use of the ship to carry persons intending to cause a security incident and/or their equipment;
7. use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction;
8. attacks from seaward whilst at berth or at anchor; and
9. Attacks whilst at sea.
4.2.6 Consideration of conflicts
The SSA should take into account all possible vulnerabilities, which may include:
1. conflicts between safety and security measures;
2. conflicts between shipboard duties and security assignments;
3. watch-keeping duties, number of ship’s personnel, particularly with implications on crew fatigue, alertness and performance;
4. any identified security training deficiencies; and
5. Any security equipment and systems, including communication systems and their maintenance.
4.2.7 The effect of security measures on ship's personnel
The CSO and SSO should always have regard to the effect that security measures may have on ship’s personnel who will remain on the ship for long periods. When developing security measures, particular consideration should be given to:
1. the convenience, comfort and personal privacy of the ship’s personnel; and
2. Their ability to maintain their effectiveness over long periods.
4.2.8 Reporting
Upon completion of the SSA, a report shall be prepared, consisting of
1. a summary of how the assessment was conducted;
2. a description of each vulnerability found during the assessment; and
3. A description of counter measures that could be used to address each vulnerability.
The report shall be protected from unauthorized access or disclosure. If the SSA has not been carried out by the Company the SSA documentation shall be reviewed and verified by the CSO.
4.3 Follow up
In the case of changes of the operational or physical parameters of the vessel(s), the SSA with the on-scene security survey shall be repeated.
4.3.1 Periodic Review of the SSA.
The SSA shall be reviewed periodically. Records of the reviews shall be prepared and kept on board for verification.
Appendix 1
Step 1: identify and classify likelihood of threat motives.
The objective is to identify possible threat motives and potential security risks for the operation of the vessel.
Operational security risks Examples of possible scenarios Likelihood Comments for further
consideration
Unlikely Probable Likely
1. Political motives
1.1 Is your ship trading in an area with a known or perceived unstable political situation? etc. Countries with elections, demonstrations, civil war, riots, X
1.2 Is there known or perceived political (incl. religious, ideological, ethnical, nationalistic) motives related to your ship (flag, owner, crew) or trade (cargo, passengers, trade area or port)? Cargo (e.g. weapon parts, nuclear cargo); trade area, ports, etc.
X
2. Symbolic motives
2.1 Could your ship be used as a means to harm symbolic objects of national or international importance? Well known buildings, statues, bridges, etc. X
2.2 Does your ship visit a port where international events take place? Exhibitions, sports, political, etc. (Olympic Games, EXPO,
World Leader Summits, etc.) X
2.3 Could your ship be used as means to harm important environmental areas? Areas for tourism, commercial exploitation of nature (fish farming, beaches, cities, etc.) X
2.4 Does your ship itself represent or carry a symbolic value? Ship carries special cargo (e.g. weapons), support operations (oil to war actions, equipment to industry projects), represent attitudes at debate (cruise, natural resources, etc.) X
2.5 Does the visibility or the profile of your ship, company or brand give rise to concern as a motive for unlawful acts? Because of your policy (exploitation of labour, political attitudes), the operations you are involved (natural resources, weapons, etc.) X
3. Economical damage
3.1 Does your ship carry special cargo (economical value, restricted availability)? Plutonium, equipment for mass destruction, etc. X
3.2 Is it likely that terror related smuggling could be taking place from ports your ship is visiting? Smuggling of people/goods (Intelligence) X
3.3 Is it likely that your crew can take part in or give support to terror related smuggling? Ethnical motives and common cause X
3.4 Is your ship trading in an area known for piracy? Refer to periodic Piracy Report X
3.5 Does your ship, cargo or passengers represent a significant risk of hijacking? Valuable ship, cargo and passengers used for threats and bargaining demands X
4. Damage to society / industry
4.1 Could your ship be used to damage important geographical points for trade or commercial activity? Block ports or canal, collide with bridges or offshore installations, etc. X
4.2 Is the trade your ship represents critical to society? Critical equipment to industry projects (e.g. pipelines, offshore installations, etc.), or for industry production (gold, silver, silicates, etc.) X
4.3 Will an unlawful act against your ship or trade harm the state of the industry? Reduced market due to reduced trust (cruise, passenger transport, etc.) X
5. Fear and others
5.1 Can the ship be used to create fear to the society? Discharge of oil or poisoning gas, radioactive materials, chemicals, explosion of the cargo, etc.
Step 2: The objective is to identify and evaluate key ship board operations, activities and persons that is important to protect and to identify existing security measures, procedures and operations.
Operations, systems, areas and personnel important to be protected Criticality Security measures Describe existing measures / procedures / operations / weaknesses / limitations
Low High Yes No
1. Access control - personnel, passengers, visitors
1.1 Access ladders (including Pilot Ladders) X X monitor visually
1.2 Access gangways X X "
1.3 Access ramps - -
1.4 Access doors, side scuttles, windows and ports X X use of alarms
1.5 Mooring ropes and anchor chains X X monitor visually
1.6 Cranes and hosting gear X X "
1.7 Access by ships side (freeboard) X X "
1.8 Equipment and baggage brought onboard X X to be inspected
1.9 Unaccompanied baggage found onboard x x to be inspected
2. Restricted areas on the ship
2.1 Navigation bridge x x Lock secure access points
2.2 Navigational means (radio, radar, GPS, etc. x x Lock secure access points
2.3 Machinery spaces, power supplies, steering gear rooms x x Lock secure access points
2.4 Emergency sources of power x x Lock secure access points
2.5 Spaces containing cargo pumps and their controls x x Lock secure access points
2.6 Crew accommodation; x x Use alarms
2.7 Galley/pantry x x Monitor visually
2.8 ventilation and air-conditioning systems and other similar spaces x x Lock secure access points
2.9 Spaces with access to potable water tanks, pumps or manifolds. x x Lock secure access points
2.10 Cargo spaces and spaces containing ship’s stores x x Monitor visually
2.11 Spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous substances x x Monitor visually
2.12 Spaces containing security and surveillance equipment and systems and their controls and lighting system controls x x Monitor visually
2.13 Any other areas as determined by the CSO, through the SSA to which access must be restricted to maintain the security of the ship. x x Monitor visually
3. Cargo handling
3.1 Cargo access points (hatches, ports, manifold/pipes) x x Monitor visually
3.2 Cargo storage spaces (incl. access points) x x Monitor visually
3.3 Spaces containing dangerous goods or hazardous subst. x x Monitor visually
3.4 Cargo handling equipment x x Monitor visually
4. Ship stores handling
4.1 Access points for delivery to ship x x Lock secure access points
4.2 Storage spaces x x Lock secure access points
4.3 Access points to storage spaces x x Lock secure access points
5. Security monitoring
5.1 Lighting x x Monitor visually
5.2 Watch system (at sea, in port, at anchorage) x x Monitor visually
5.3 Security guards and deck watches, including patrols x x Monitor visually
5.4 Automatic intrusion detection advice - x
5.5 Surveillance monitoring x x Monitor visually
5.6 Security and surveillance equipment spaces x x Monitor visually
5.7 Locking devices, seals x x Monitor visually
6. Safety operations
6.1 Life boats, life rafts and life belts x x Monitor visually
6.2 Alarms, signals and marking x x Monitor visually
6.3 Evacuation routes (including Marine Evacuation Systems if applicable) x x Monitor visually
6.4 Communication equipment and procedures x x Monitor visually
6.5 Emergency Procedures (abandon ship, fire fighting, rescue, damage to hull, etc.) x x Monitor visually

Once the above information has been completed, this then becomes the relevant appendix 3 within the ship security assessment.
Appendix 2:
The number of scenarios is left to the result of the table in step 1 and step 2. An initial evaluation should at least consider those scenarios provided in table below with emphasis being taken to avoid unnecessarily evaluating excessive scenarios that result in low consequences.
Minor variations of the same scenario do not need to be evaluated separately unless there are measurable differences in consequences.
A scenarios list of threat motives for the operational parameters for that type of vessel:
Scenarios Application Considerations
1. Intrude and / or take control of the target and ... a. Damage / destroy the vessel with explosives Intruder plants explosives. Does your ship carry special cargo i.e. passengers, LNG, LPG
b. Damage/destroy the vessel through malicious operations/acts
• Intruder takes control of a vessel and runs it aground or collides with something intentionally.
• Intruder intentionally opens valves to release Hazmat, etc. • To cause environmental disaster.
• To cause shipping hazard in port approach / choke point.
c. Create a hazardous or pollution incident without destroying the vessel • Intruder opens valves/vents to release toxic materials or releases toxic material brought along.
• Intruder overrides interlocks leading to damage/destruction. To cause environmental disaster.
d. Take hostages/kill people Goal of the intruder is to kill people.
e. Disable critical vessel services (e.g., propulsion, steering, power) Intruder creates damage to critical equipment so vessel is vulnerable to grounding.
2. Externally attack the vessel by … a. Moving explosives adjacent to vessel:
• From the waterside
• On the shore side
• Subsurface USS Cole style attack.
• Car/truck bomb.
• frogman
b. Ramming a stationary target:
• With a vessel
• With a land-based target. Intentional collision meant to damage/destroy the target (i.e. waterway choke point). NOTE: Evaluate overall consequences from the collision, but only evaluate the vulnerabilities of the vessel and not the vulnerabilities of the target being rammed. Potential to cause shipping hazard i.e. port approach/choke point.
c. stand off attack launching or shooting weapons from a distance Shooting at a vessel using a rifle, missile, etc. Armour piercing rounds could be devastating fired at an LPG.
3. Use the vessel as a means of transferring … a. Materials to be used as a weapon into / out of the country
b. People into/out of the country

1. Consequence Assessment:
Each scenario should be evaluated in terms of the potential consequences of the attack. Three elements and its descriptor are included in the consequence assessment:
Component Descriptor
Death and injury The potential number of lives that could be lost and injuries occurring as a result of an attack scenario.
Economic impact The potential economic impact of an attack scenario.
Environmental impact The potential environmental impact of an attack scenario.

The appropriate consequence rating should be evaluated for each scenario. Consequence ratings and criteria with benchmarks are provided in the following Table. These ratings are intended to be broad relative estimates. The appropriate rating is determined by using the consequence component that results in the highest rating.
Assign a rating If the impact could be
3 CATASTROPHIC (Extreme) = Numerous loss of life or injuries, major national or long term economic impact, complete destruction of multiple aspects of the eco-system over a large area
2 SIGNIFICANT (High) = Multiple loss of life or injuries, major regional economic impact, long-term damage to a portion of the ecosystem.
1 MODERATE = Little or no loss of life or injuries, minimal economic impact, or some environmental damage.

2. Vulnerability Assessment
Each scenario should be evaluated in terms of the vessel’s vulnerability to an attack. The two elements of the vulnerability score are:
Element Descriptor
Accessibility
(availability) Accessibility of the vessel to the attack scenario. This relates to physical and geographic barriers that deter the threat independently of organic security.
Organic Security
(vessel hardness) The ability of the shipboard organization to deter the attack. It includes security plans, communication capability, guard force, intrusion detection systems, and timeliness of outside law enforcement to prevent attack.
The vulnerability score and the criteria with benchmark examples are provided in the following table. Each scenario should be evaluated to get the individual score for each element and then sum these elements to get the total vulnerability score (consequence rating). This score should be used as the vulnerability score when evaluating each scenario in the next step.
Category Accessibility Organic security
3 No deterrence (e.g. unrestricted access to vessel and unrestricted internal movement). No deterrence capability (e.g. no plan, no guard force, no emergency communications, outside law enforcement not available for timely prevention, no detection capability).
2 Good deterrence e.g. single substantial barrier; unrestricted access to within 100 yards of vessel). Good deterrence capability (e.g. minimal security plan, some communications, armed guard force of limited size relative to the vessel; outside law enforcement not available for timely prevention, limited detection systems).
1 Excellent deterrence (expected to deter attack; access restricted to within 500 yards of vessel; multiple physical/geographical barriers). Excellent deterrence capability expected to deter attack; covert security elements that represent additional elements not visible or apparent).
3. Mitigation:
The company should next determine which scenarios may require mitigation strategies (protective measures) implemented. This is accomplished by determining where the scenario falls in the table below based on the consequences and vulnerability assessment scores. Following are terms used in Table 4 as mitigation categories:
Mitigate: means that mitigation strategies, such as security protective measures and/or procedures, may be developed to reduce risk for that scenario. An appendix to the Vessel Security Plan may contain the scenario(s) evaluated, the results of the evaluation, a description of the mitigation measure evaluated, and the reason mitigation measures were or were not chosen.
Consider: means that the scenario should be considered and mitigation strategies should be developed on a case-by-case basis. The Vessel Security Plan may contain the scenario(s) evaluated; the results of the evaluation, and the reason mitigation measures were or were not chosen.
Document: means that the scenario may not need a mitigation measure at this time and therefore needs only to be documented. However, mitigation measures having little cost may still merit consideration. The security plan may contain the scenario evaluated and the results. This will be beneficial in further revisions of the security plan, to know if the underlying assumptions have changed since the last edition of the security assessment.
Table below is intended as broad, relative tool to assist in the development of the vessel security plan. “Results” are not intended to be the sole basis to trigger or waive the need for specific measure, but are tools in identifying potential vulnerabilities and evaluating prospective methods to address them.
Consequence Score Total Vulnerability Score
2 3-4 5-6
3 Consider Mitigate Mitigate
2 Document Consider Mitigate
1 Document Document Consider
To assist in determining which scenarios may require mitigation methods, the company may find it beneficial to use the table in appendix 3 provided below. The vessels owner and/or operator can record the scenarios considered, the consequence score table, outcome of the each element of vulnerability as to table of vulnerability score, and the mitigation category as to the table above.
Appendix 3:
Step 1: The objective is to identify possible threat scenarios to the key ship board operations in the relevant column (yes, or no), possible consequences rating, assess the security score, and finally to determine the mitigation results, in order to establish and prioritize security protective measures or mitigation strategy.
Possible threat scenarios Relevant Possible consequences Vulnerability score Security score mitigation
results
Yes No 1 2 3 Access. organic
1. Damage to, or destruction of, the ship (bombing, arson, sabotage, vandalism)
Conceal explosives onboard, initiate with timer or remote device X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Bring explosives onboard, suicidal/high risk action X X 3 2 5 MITIGATE
Place explosives in cargo, initiate with timer or remote device X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Attach explosives to hull, initiate with timer or remote device X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Cause explosion on or alongside ship by external craft, torpedo, mine, etc. X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Force oil/gas leakage from cargo tanks or engine room fuel tanks X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Set ship on fire X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Open bow, side or stern ports, cargo hatch to sink or capsize X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Drain holes to sink or capsize X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Cut pipes (water intake) to change trim X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Activate pumps to change trim X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
2. Hijacking or seizure of the ship or of persons on board
Crew takes control over ship – mutiny X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Passengers take control - - - - -
Stowaways/boarded person (pirates) take control X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Hijacking through (bomb) threat X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Hijacking of crew or passengers X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Unlawful detention of ship, crew or passengers by port authority or state X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
3. Tampering with cargo, essential ship equipment or systems or ship’s stores
Damage or immobilize critical systems like propulsion, steering gear etc. X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Damage or immobilize emergency sources of power X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Contaminate bunker X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Damage ship systems, navigation, loading, ballast X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Input false navigational data/guidance (radar, VTS, pilot, chart) X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Contaminate drinking water, food or air-conditioning X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Release gas onboard X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Contaminate cargo X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Destroy lifesaving equipment X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Destroy ship interiors X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
4. Unauthorized access or use including presence of stowaways
Stowaways sneaking onboard, concealment in cargo/service or storage spaces (including containers) X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Boarding ship at port or during voyage as “passenger” or “crew” X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Boarding ship at port or during voyage as “pilot”, “supplier”, “surveyor”, fake castaway X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Unauthorized boarding of ship at pilot station or VTS operations X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Unauthorized boarding of ship at voyage via vessel / craft / helicopter X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Unauthorized boarding ship at voyage via shipwreck X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
5. Smuggling weapons or equipment, including weapons of mass destruction
Conceal weapons/equipment in cargo/service or storage spaces (including containers) X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Conceal weapons/equipment in crews luggage X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Conceal weapons/equipment in passengers Luggage X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Conceal weapons/equipment in ship supplies X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
6. Use of the ship to carry perpetrators and their personal equipment
Stowaways sneaking onboard / concealment in cargo or service / storage spaces (including containers) X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Boarding ship at port or during voyage as “passenger” or “crew” X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Boarding ship at port or during voyage as fake “pilot”, “supplier”, “surveyor”, or similar X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
7. Use of the ship itself as a weapon or as a means to cause damage or destruction
Crew take control over ship X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Passengers take control X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Stowaways/boarded person take control X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Damage or immobilize critical systems like propulsion, steering etc in a critical position (near terminal etc) X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Given a hijacked situation (item 4) Take control over ship and hit another ship X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Given a hijacked situation (item 4) Take control over ship and hit a land based construction / terminal / chemical plant or similar X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Given a hijacked situation (item 4) Take control over ship and hit an offshore installation X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Given a hijacked situation (item 4) Take control over ship and hit a rock / provoke grounding X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
8. Attacks from seaward
Pirates take control over ship X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Terrorists take control over ship X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Vessel rammed by terrorists using explosives X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
9. Attacks whilst at sea
Pirates take control over ship X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Terrorists take control over ship X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Vessel rammed by terrorists using explosives X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
10. Other possible scenarios
Environmental extremists take control over ship X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Labour unrest – crew complaints, strife, lack of pay leading to unrest etc. X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Labour strife ashore leading to problems of access to vessel X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Collateral damage – caused by explosion or terrorist activities in the vicinity of the vessel X X 3 2 5 CONSIDER
Step 2: once the above table complete the relevant scenarios required mitigation strategy. The mitigation strategies (protective measures) are implemented to reduce vulnerabilities. The overall desire is to reduce the risk associated with the identified scenario.
To evaluating the effectiveness of specific mitigation strategies (protective measures), the company may find it beneficial to use table here below.






Mitigation Determination Worksheet

Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5

Mitigation Strategy
(Protective Measures) Scenario(s)
that are
affected by
Mitigation
Strategy (from
Step 1 in
Table 5) Consequence
Score
(remains the
same) Vulnerability Score
(Table 3) New
Mitigation
Results
(Table 4)
Accessibility + Organic =
Total
Security Score
Accessibility:
Deterrence increased by
implementing increased
AT SEA
1. Scenario 1 2 2 2 4 Consider
security measures.
Organic Security:
Deterrence increased by
implementing increased 2 2 2 4 Consider
security measures 2. Scenario 2


Accessibility:
Deterrence increased by
implementing increased
security measures AT PORT

3. Scenario 3 2 1 2 3 Consider
Organic Security:
Deterrence increased by
implementing increased
security measures. 4. Scenario 4 2 1 2 3 Consider
Port Facility Security
Measures and their Level
of security will affect the
Accessibility score in the 5. Scenario 5 1 1 2 3 Document
Vulnerability table.

Appendix 4:
Examine all the information gathered and assess for any weaknesses. Weaknesses should be noted and addressed during the initial on-scene security survey. The objective of the initial On-Scene Security Survey is to examine and evaluate existing shipboard protective measures, procedures and operations.
Initial On-Scene Security Survey Yes No Recommendations
1. Monitoring of deck area and areas surrounding the ship B/8.14.4
Lighting of all deck areas and areas surrounding the ship sufficient? X
Responsibilities defined for the maintenance of lighting devices? X
Responsibilities and procedures for lighting defined? X
Are all access points to the ship lighted? X
Are critical and vulnerable areas lighted? X
Is the vessel sufficiently lighted at anchorage? X
Do lights overlap if a light fails? X
Are ship’s sides properly lighted? X
Are there sufficient spare parts (bulbs, fuses, etc.)? X
Is there auxiliary power available? X
Are measures in place to monitor the deck area? X
Are measures in place to monitor the area surrounding the vessel? X
Are standing orders for watch keeping crew members available? X
Are security patrols scheduled for monitoring? X
Is there a routine for briefing of crew members/ watch keepers? X
Are there any intrusion-detection devices and/or surveillance equipment available? X
2. Controlling access to the ship, including any identification systems B/8.14.3
Are the portholes and windows to shore side and waterside closed and secured? X
Are there ladders and are they secured from unauthorized access? X
Are there measures to control access to all identified access points? see worksheet 2 X
Is there any equipment available to control access? X
Is a personnel identification system in use? X
Is the identification system regular updated? X
Is there a procedure to deny access to the vessel? X
Is there a procedure for reporting denial of access and the attempt to obtain access? X
Are vendors, visitors, workers, repairmen checked when boarding? X
Are random identity checks carried out to confirm reasons for boarding? X
Are visitors escorted throughout the ship at all times? X
Is there only a single access point for all persons visiting the ship? X
Is a permanent gangway watch established? X
Are lines and anchor chains protected against intruders? X
Is the ship/shore side controlled for access? X
Is the ship/waterside controlled for access? X
Are security notices displayed at the gangway? X
3. Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects (accompanied and unaccompanied baggage and ship's personnel personal effects) B/8.14.5
Is there a procedure to control embarkation of ship's crew/passengers? X
Is there a searching procedure for persons and baggage? X
Is there a secure area to search persons/ baggage/vehicles/? X
Is the security notice containing that persons and their personal effects are liable to be searched? X
Is there a procedure to segregate checked persons from unchecked persons? X
Is there a procedure to segregate embarking from disembarking persons? X
Is there a procedure to handle unaccompanied baggage? X
Is unaccompanied baggage searched? X
Are searching responsibilities defined? X
4. Monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access B/8.14.2
Have restricted areas been established? X
Have all the restricted areas established in worksheet 2 been taken into account and assessed? X
Is there a list or plan with all doors, hatches and openings available? X
Is there a procedure for key and lock control? X
Is the responsibility for locking defined? X
Is the responsibility for issuing keys defined? X
Is there a log for issuing keys? X
Are keys signed for? X
Is the distribution of master keys controlled? X
Are the keys and locks kept at a secure place? X
Are restricted areas adequately locked? X
Are the emergency exits of restricted areas locked from inside? X
Are the portholes and windows of the accommodations closed and secured? X
Are all hatches and their entrances secured by locks or other means? X
Are cargo hold entrances via cranes separately secured? X
5. Supervising the handling of cargo and delivery of ship's store B/8.14.6
Are measures in place for routine checks of cargo during cargo operations? X
Are visual and/or physical examinations performed? X
Are the seals checked on a random basis? X
Are checks carried out to ensure that cargo loaded matches with cargo documentation? X
Are checks carried out to prevent tampering of dangerous cargo? X
Is any scanning/detection equipment required? X
Are responsibilities for supervising defined? X
Is there a procedure for checking ship's stores? X
Is the store delivery compared with the order? X
Are the packages checked for tampering? X
Is the store on delivery immediately transferred to a secure area? X
6. Ensuring that ship security communication, information, and equipment are readily available B/8.14.7
Are technical security devices available? (CCTV, screening equipment, intrusion detection devices, alarms etc.) X
Are procedures available for testing, maintenance and calibration of such equipment? X
Are security alarms agreed and used on board? X
Is a list of communication equipment available? X
Are internal communication systems available for security purposes? X
Is a secure place available for the storage of security information? X
Are persons identified who need to know, need to have, and needed to take security information? X
7. Ensuring performance of all ship security duties B/8.14.1
Are duties and responsibilities defined for all personnel with security duties? X
Is there sufficient crew to fulfill all the security duties? X
Are communication procedures available? X
Is a plan available for searching the ship (stowaways, illegal drugs, bombs)? X
Is there a procedure to establish, maintain and update an inventory of dangerous goods and their location? X
Are drills and exercises required to ensure that crew can perform the designated security duties? X
Are contingency plans available to respond on security breaches? X
Perform initial on-scene security survey on the ship:
 May raise additional security measures have to be implemented, and;
 The weak points of the existing;
 Confirmation of security measures already in operation;
 A list of proposals for the improvement of vessel's security.
Evaluation the outcome of the SSA including the initial on-scene security survey will identify needs for security improvements; this will be in SSA report.
Appendix 5:
SHIP SECURITY ASSESSMENT (SSA) REPORT
Confidential
Name of ship UNI-R Gross tonnage 5868 M/T
Name of class society INSB IMO No. 8113138
Flag St. Vincent Call Sign TBA
Port of registry KINGSTWON Type GENERAL CARGO
Trading area : Mediterranean sea , black sea .

Date of SSA 16.03.2009
Date of On-Scene Security Survey
Place of On-Scene Security Survey
Name and signature of Assessor

Summary on how the SSA was conducted:
The SSA is based in approach adopted in USCG NVIC 10 – 02
1- identification of threat motives against ship specific ( see Appendix 1 )
2- selection of security threat scenarios ( see Appendix 3 )
3- determination of existing security measures and weaknesses – On scene security
survey ( see Appendix 2 )
4- mitigation determination ( see Appendix 3 )
5- Determination of mitigation strategies ( protective measures ) ( see Appendix 4 )
6- Mitigation strategies implementation ( see Appendix 4 )



Description of each vulnerability found during the assessment:

1- Conflicts between safety and security measures
2- Duties and responsibilities are not defined for all personal involved in security
Actions – see Appendix 2 section 7 . conflict between shipboard duties and security
Assignments
3- Unsufficient measures and procedures for access controlling to the ship – see
Appendix 2 sec. 2 .
4- Unsufficient measures and procedures for persons ' identification , controlling and
escorting - see Appendix 2 sec. 2 .
5- Unsufficient measures and procedures for monitoring of deck areas and areas
Surrounding the ship – see Appendix 2 sec. 1.
6- Unsufficient measures and procedures for controlling the embarkation of persons
And their effects ( accompanied and unaccompanied baggage ) see Appendix
2 sec. 3 .
7- Restricted areas haven't been established and marked , unsufficient keys control
see Appendix 2 sec. 4 .
8- Unsufficient supervising the handling of cargo – see Appendix 2 section 5 .
9- communication procedure in the range of security are not established
security alarms are not agreed – see Appendix 2 sec. 6 .
10- A security alert system and identification number are not established .
11- Lacking some contingency plans like ; bomb threats and responses , searching of spaces
searching of persons and their baggage , hijacking , actual or attempted attacks
On ships – see Appendix 2 sec. 7.
12- A plan of drills & exercises required to ensure that crew can perform the designated
security duties is not worked out – see Appendix 2 sec. 7.



Description of the counter measures that could be used to address each above mentioned vulnerability:

1- If , in master's professional judgment , a conflict between any safety and security
Requirement arises , the master will give effect to those requirement necessary
To maintain the safety of the ship.
2- Determination of security responsibilities and duties for all crew . Involving cadets
Into security duties .
3- Identifications of access points and implementation of a procedure for access controlling
To the ship.
4- Determination of persons' identification required to board this ship.
5- Implementation of a procedure for monitoring of deck areas and areas surrounding
The ship.
6- Implementation of measures and a procedure for controlling the embarkation
Of persons and their effects.
7- Establishing and marking of restricted areas. Implementation of keys control.
8- Implementation of procedure for supervising the handling of cargo.
9- Implementation of communication procedure in the range of security . establishing
Security alarms.
10- Installation of lacking systems according to time schedule in SOLAS convention.
11- Implementation of lacking contingency plans.
12- Working out a plan of security drills and exercises and its implementation.


Date SSA reviewed: Name and Signature:
Date SSA accepted: Name and Signature:

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